When policy makers and commentators express concerns about how little most American workers have saved for retirement, they should focus on three related facts:
1. Roughly half of all American workers are employed by a firm that does NOT offer them any retirement plan.
2. Only 14% of small firms — with fewer than 100 employees — offer them any type of retirement plan.
3. 42 million workers –approximately one third of full-time workers in the private sector — work for small firms.
Of course, these employees of small firms have the right to go to a financial institution, file an application for an Individual Retirement Account ( IRA ), and enjoy federal tax deductions for their IRA contributions. Yet relatively few overcome the forces of inertia and take the time to open an IRA on their own. Only about 5% of employees without a retirement plan at work contribute to an IRA on a regular basis, according to best estimates.
In response to these problems, Mark Iwry and David John (both from Washington think tanks at the time) developed federal legislation that would create the Automatic IRA. This legislation would require all employers without a retirement plan, and with over a specified number of employees, to connect their payrolls to a retirement plan at a qualified financial institution. Then, approximately 3% of the salary of these employees would be contributed each month to this retirement plan, unless they decided to opt out.
Such opt-out plans have been very successful in raising the participation rate of employees in retirement plans, especially low-income and minority employees. In addition, the Automatic IRA does NOT require any contribution by the employer to the retirement plan of its employees. And the proposed legislation has garnered considerable support from both Democrats and Republicans. Nevertheless, Congress has not come close to passing the Automatic IRA.
Read the rest at realclearmarkets.com…
Small employers that offer health insurance have usually offered fully insured products through traditional health plans. Recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has created new requirements for fully insured products that will entice more small firms to fund their own health-care benefits. However, self-funding poses significant risks to these small firms, their employees, and state exchanges. To mitigate some of these risks within current political realities, we recommend advance disclosures—to small firms of material changes in their stop-loss policies, and to their employees that premium subsidies are available only on ACA exchanges. We also suggest strengthening Small Business Health Options Program exchanges by broadening the availability of subsidies and building partnerships with brokers. Finally, we recommend an expanded role for brokers and third-party administrators in helping small firms improve their choice of health-care insurance.
Read the rest in the Risk Management and Insurance Review…
Although many commentators have criticized the underfunding of public pension plans, relatively few have focused on the huge underfunding of retiree health care plans of states and cities. At the time of Detroit’s bankruptcy, for example, its pension plan was underfunded by over $3 billion, but the unfunded deficit in its retiree health care plan was close to $6 billion.
The good news is that retiree health care plans can legally be revised more easily than pension plans. In specific, the US Supreme Court has recently issued an opinion setting forth principles of contract interpretation that will lead local governments and public unions to reach explicit agreements on the scope of such plans. Those agreements will probably have to include some cost reductions because the health care plans of many local governments will otherwise be subject to the Affordable Care Act’s 40 percent “Cadillac” tax starting in 2018.
This post will be divided into four parts. It will explain
- the reasons why retiree health care plans have stayed under the radar screen and how that is changing;
- the magnitude of underfunding of retiree health care plans and the implications for state-city budgets;
- the principles of interpreting collective bargaining agreements recently enunciated by the US Supreme Court; and
- the various ways local governments are now trying to manage down their health care obligations over time and strategies that governments and public-sector unions can use to address this challenge.
Read the rest at healthaffairs.org
Coauthored with Theresa Hamacher
The death knell of active portfolio management has been rung. But with recent studies suggesting that the costs of passive management are rising, has the bell tolled too soon?
Last year, Charles Ellis seemed to predict the imminent demise of active management when he wrote that “the costs of active investment are so high and the incremental returns so low that, for clients, the money game is no longer a game worth playing”. Mr Ellis, a longtime commentator on asset management trends, suggested that investors would be better served if investment professionals shifted their focus toward financial planning and away from stock picking.
Mr Ellis’s comments only reflected what was happening in the investment world. Investors have been steadily shifting assets from actively managed funds into passive. At the end of 2013, index funds accounted for one dollar of every five invested in U.S. mutual funds overall and, stunningly, more than one-third of the assets in US equity funds.
While the interest in index funds is understandable, the disdain for active management is ironic. Active management is what makes index funds attractive in the first place.
How is that? Proponents of passive investing argue that index funds are the only logical alternative when markets are efficient, meaning that asset prices accurately reflect all information. Active managers have a tough time making money in efficient markets because asset mispricings are rare. In efficient markets, index funds generate the same returns while costing less.
Read more at ft.com
Unlike pension plans, governments are not required to contribute to separate trusts to support health-care promises. As a result, only 11 states have funded more than 10% of retiree health-care liabilities, according to a November 2013 report from the credit-rating agency Standard & Poor’s. For example, New Jersey has almost no assets backing one of the largest retiree health-care liabilities of any state—$63.8 billion.
Only eight out of the 30 largest U.S. cities have funded more than 5% of their retiree health-care obligations, according to a study released last March by the Pew Charitable Trust. New York City tops the list with $22,857 of unfunded liabilities per household.
What exactly are retiree health-care obligations? State and local governments typically pay most of the insurance premiums for employees who retire before they are eligible for Medicare at age 65. That can be a long commitment, as many workers retire as early as 50. Many governments also pay a percentage of Medicare premiums once retired workers turn 65.
Total U.S. unfunded health-care liabilities exceeded $530 billion in 2009, the Government Accountability Office estimated, but the current number may be closer to $1 trillion, according to a 2014 comprehensive study released by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Governments usually finance health-care spending with current revenues from property taxes and other sources. They’ll need to reverse this spending growth to have enough revenue to pay for essential services such as schools and police.
Read the rest at brookings.edu
Unfunded Retiree Healthcare: The Elephant in the Room
The following outline is accompanied by a set of slides that were recently presented at the the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in November 2014
Download the Slides
Watch the presentation on youtube.com
- When Detroit declared bankruptcy, the press highlighted its unfunded pension obligations. But actually its unfunded retiree healthcare liabilities were almost twice as large. This is why we say that retiree healthcare is the elephant in the room –sitting quietly with little notice in the halls of cities and states
- This set of slides will turn the search light on retiree health care benefits in 4 steps:
- Define these benefits and how they are reported by states/cities,
- Outline the huge amounts of unfunded liabilities for these benefits,
- Compare the rules on public pension to those on public retiree healthcare, and
- Evaluate various proposals to curb the growth of unfunded healthcare liabilities.
- Retiree healthcare benefits mainly take the form of government subsidies of insurance premiums to public employees who retire before going on Medicare at age 65. Sometimes these premium subsidies extend to premiums for Part B of Medicare and even Medigap. These subsidies range from 50% to 80% of the retiree’s premiums on a high-end healthcare policy.
- Retiree healthcare benefits constitute the bulk of OPEBs – other post employment benefits. Before 2006, there was virtually no disclosure about OPEBs so they could be increased without political accountability. Since 2006, GASB has required states and cities to report on their OPEBs in the footnotes to their financial statements. But GASB has never required any advance funding of OPEBs, as is required for public pension plans.
- Recently, GASB has announced proposals to standardize the calculation of OPEBs – most importantly, by mandating the use of a discount rate based on AA rated bonds. Under these proposals, OPEBs would be included as liabilities on city and state balance sheets. These proposals, if adopted, could affect bond ratings and focus political debate on this subject.
- Turning to the scope of the problem, we can see a big discrepancy between states. States like NY and NJ each have over $60 billion in unfunded liabilities (and high OPEB per capita). States like South Dakota and Idaho have low unfunded liabilities (and low OPEB per capita). This depends on the number of public employees covered by OPEBs and the extent of their benefits. (The median state in this S&P survey of unfunded OPEB liabilities was $1,219 per capita).
- The problem of unfunded OPEB liabilities is growing in many states due to chronic underfunding. Here we see in the left bar the percentage of state tax revenues actually used to fund OPEBs, versus the higher percentage that should have been contributed based on 6% returns and 30 years of level payments. States are justifying their lower contributions by back-loaded amortization periods and assumptions of higher returns. According to JP Morgan, most states annually contributed 30% to 60% of what was needed to fund its OPEBs.
- Similarly, on the city level, we see a great disparity in levels of OPEB funding across the country. The unfunded OPEB liabilities of New York City were twice the total of the 30 largest cities. And New York City also had the highest unfunded OPEB liability per household, followed by Boston. The figures of New York City include its obligations to teachers for retiree healthcare. By contrast, Denver, Minneapolis and Tampa had very low unfunded OPEBs by dollar amount and household.
- The situation in California is complex. The unfunded OPEBs from State government is almost the same amount as New York State, though California has a lower unfunded OPEB liability per capital. But other governmental units in California have promised healthcare benefits to their retirees. These include counties, cities, school districts, the UC system and the trial courts. Thus, the total OPEB liabilities for California were over $157 billion, of which less than 5% was funded.
- The level of OPEB funding is much lower than the level of pension funding , because there never has been a funding requirement for OPEBs. As a result, OPEBs must generally be funded out of current tax revenues. On the other hand, pension obligations to employees are often protected by statute or state constitution. Since these protections do not generally apply to OPEBs, they are easier to change from a legal viewpoint, though these changes are still often subject to collective bargaining.
- Because OPEBs are generally funded out of current tax revenues, it is useful to compare the growth trends in OPEBs and property taxes. This comparison is made in the chart on page 11. The increase in retiree healthcare costs ( HC ) is absorbing a large portion of the growth in property taxes in 3 of the cities, and actually exceeds the growth in property taxes in Springfield.
- Let’s look at Newton, a Boston suburb with 170,000 people. Newton is spending $21 million per year on retiree healthcare benefits — which equals $747 per household or 7.5% of the average property tax bill. To increase property taxes by $8.4 million, Newton had to pass an override of proposition 2.5. But most of that increase — $8.1 million — is going to pay retiree healthcare benefits as they rise. If that $8.1 million instead had gone into adding teachers, Newton could have hired 79 more teachers.
- So what can be done to constrain the growth of OPEBs? It is very difficult to reduce healthcare benefits going to those already retired. However, some jurisdictions have directly addressed healthcare costs in the future: by increasing future deductibles and copayments, decreasing cost of living adjustments and reducing the scope of subsidized healthcare services — e.g., retirees pay full premiums of dental and eye care.
- In California, the courts have generally been receptive to modest limits in OPEB benefits. The courts have generally taken the position that counties did not promise PERMANENT healthcare benefits as a specific level, and they are not guaranteed by statute or the constitution. But the court rejected the changes proposed by Los Angeles City as an impairment of a vested right — citing precedents from pension law.
- Another approach is to revise the eligibility standards for retirees to qualify for OPEBs. A worker can qualify for OPEBs in Mass, for example, after only 10 years of PART TIME work. Many workers can receive OPEBs even if they retire and go to work for a company with healthcare benefits. When workers reach age 65 and go on Medicare, they could be asked to pay their own Part B premiums.
- The majority of states have cost of living adjustments built into their OPEB plans. Yet 17 states have recently reduced COLAs for retiree healthcare benefits. While most of these COLAs reductions were legally challenged, the courts have generally upheld these reductions on the theory that the COLA portion is not a contractual right.
- Most healthcare plans utilized by retirees with OPEBs are relatively high cost and high quality. Very few of these plans are provided through a state connector offering a menu of healthcare plans. However, an individual can receive federal premium subsidies under Obamacare only by purchasing a policy on a state connector. Thus, if retired public employees were required to obtain their policies through the state connectors, the federal premium subsidies could be used to offset local premium contributions.
- Here is an illustration of the costs and premium subsidies for a gold level plan from the Mass connector. For a family of four with an annual income of $50,000 per year, the government premium subsidy is $945 per month out of a total policy cost of $1,319 per month. Thus, the city or state could be pay NO premium subsidy and the retiree would receive a high quality plan for only $374 per month.
- Conclusions — While unfunded OPEBs have been rising faster than unfunded pensions, the OPEB situation will become highlighted by the new disclosure and accounting rules.These new rules should stimulate an open and honest debate on the various proposals to limit the growth of unfunded OPEBs, which are legally easier to change than the provisions of a public pension plan.
President Obama’s proposal is well intentioned but may not get workers to save more. A better plan: Automatically enroll workers to an IRA.
President Obama recently proposed to help more workers save for retirement through an executive order creating the myRA. The plan is being billed as the ROTH IRA for every man or woman with neither access to a 401(k) plan at their workplace nor the lump-sum deposit to open an IRA on their own.
Though well-intentioned, this isn’t the best way to encourage workers to save more – it’s just a politically easier route. A better way is to automatically enroll workers with a retirement plan through payroll deductions and give them the option to opt out. Congress has considered such a plan for years, but it has never gone anywhere and it’s tough to see how things could turn around given the partisan bikering we’ve seen in Washington.
Nonetheless, an automatic Individual Retirement Account (IRA) is worth re-evaluating as the president makes his pitch for myRa. Half of America’s full-time employees, about 75 million, are not offered any type of retirement plan at work (except for Social Security). Although many work at small firms with fewer than 10 employees, some work at larger firms. Over 20% of American employers with 100 or more employees — mainly in agricultural, construction and retail sectors –do not offer any type of retirement plan at work…
Read the full article at Fortune.com…
While many commentators have expressed concerns about the large deficits of public pension plans, few have rung the alarm about the large deficits of retiree healthcare plans (RHPs) of local governments. In fact, the funding gaps for RHPs are usually at least 20% higher than those for public pensions. For example, the Mass Taxpayers Foundation has recently reported that Massachusetts local governments – cities and towns ( not the State ) – are saddled with $15 billion in pension deficits as compared to $30 billion in RHP deficits.
RHP deficits are larger than pension deficits of local governments for two main reasons. First, until 2004, no local government was required to include RHP deficits on their balance sheets. Even now, local governments are generally allowed to calculate these deficits on the basis of whatever they believe is the expected return on assets – as opposed to the actual return. Second, local governments have never been required to pre-fund RHP liabilities, in contrast to the pre-funding requirements for most pension plans that have been in place for two or three decades. In Massachusetts for instance, the funded ratio of assets to liabilities is 57% for local government pensions, but less than 1% for their RHPs…
Read the complete article at realclearmarkets.com